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INSTITUTIONAL NORMATIVE ORDER:
A CONCEPTION OF LAW
Neil MacCormickt

INTRODUCTION

Once upon a time, there was a controversy between Karl
Olivecrona and Hans Kelsen about the "ought." Olivecrona offered
indignant commentary on Kelsen's remark that the world of the
"ought" is a "great mystery," whereto Olivecrona opined that a mystery
it was and a mystery it would remain forever.' At the risk of tackling
the day-before-yesterday's problem rather than something more decently modem, not to say later-than-modem, I want in a way to address this issue here. Our seminar of this day being, after all, about
the foundations of jurisprudence, the nature and sources of law, I
hope it will be relevant to address again the issue of the "ought" by
reflecting a little on the character of normative order and on its specific manifestation in positive law, which is what I shall call "institutional normative order." The strategy here is to discuss first normative
order, then institutional normative order, then in the light of all that,
two key differentiations: that of positive law set against moral order,
and that of law set against politics.
At any given time, any one of us has an idea of how the world is,
but only a broad and vague idea. Television, radio, newspapers, and
other media keep us broadly informed about what is going on, though
we confine our attention to particular subjects that interest us. Our
awareness of history and geography lets us locate ourselves somewhere
terrestrially in the context of some narrative awareness of our present
time in its continuity with past events, either directly recalled or spoken to in some memories or texts or reports available to us. Our own
idiosyncratic understanding of the natural and social sciences gives us
a broad idea of how things go along, and we have a common-sense
grasp of how other people are likely to act and how our social situation is likely to change over time. We have some cosmological understanding of the earth in relation to the rest of the universe, and either
t

Leverhulme Personal Research Professor and Regius Professor of Public Law and

the Law of Nature and Nations, University of Edinburgh. This paper is a substantially

reworked version of my Otto Brusiin Lecture "Law as Institutional Normative Order"
presented before the Finnish Academy of Science and Letters in September 1994.
1

KARL OLIVECRONA, LAw AS FAcr 21 (1939) (quoting HANS KELSEN, HAUPTPROBLEME

DER STAATSRECHTSLEHRE 441 (1911)).

1051

1052

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 82:1051

do or do not have an awareness of or faith in a divine being that underpins it all and in some sense guarantees it. With or without that,
we have an actual perceptual consciousness of our immediate surroundings, and can to some extent give an account of what is going
on here now, though by the time any such account is given, things
have already moved on into some new state of being. Even the most
learned and perceptive and well-placed of us has only partial information in consciousness at any moment, always in a context of imperfect
memory, possibly inaccurate scientific foundations, and conjecture
concerning probabilities.
Since Hume, we have been used to contrasting the "is" and the
"ought,"2 and in this, I think we have mainly tended to contrast the
straightforward factuality of the "is" with the somehow slippery character of the normative "ought." By drawing attention to the rather
vague quality of our grasp of the "is," I seek to administer a modest
corrective to this tendency. After all, I can usually be somewhat more
certain about how things ought to be than about how they actually
are. To hold or perhaps even to know that murder is wrong, or thus,
that people ought not to be killed willfully and with malice aforethought, is to hold or know something that holds good everywhere
and all the time (or, if I am thinking legally, everywhere within the
jurisdiction by which my thought is bounded). Indeed, I can be a lot
more confident that nobody ought to be murdered than I can be sure
that nobody is being, has been, or is about to be murdered, even in
my quite near vicinity. I can be certain that murder is wrong, but not
that it won't happen. The same goes for jumping the red traffic light,
or for acts of housebreaking, or for lying or breaking promises.
To think about the world, certainly to think of it beyond one's
perceptual field, is to have some kind of picture or narrative account
of it. This frames how I think it is, has been, has come to pass, and will
probably go on. The meaning of such thoughts is clear enough, for
they either match the world or they do not, and if they do, that is how
it really is. (The trouble is that we can't check it all by direct immediate inspection-that is, indeed, the very trouble from which I started.)
The "ought" is of course different. The picture or narrative, as I hold
it ought to be, is not one that is confirmed by how events are or turn
out. It is an ideal picture or narrative, one to which I envisage the
world being made to conform, as it does on all the occasions when no
one murders a neighbor, breaks into another person's house, jumps a
traffic light, tells a lie, or breaks a promise.
If, however, I have some practical commitments concerning the
way the world ought to be, or the way it ought to go on, I can be fairly
2
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certain what these commitments add up to. In this way, I can have
greater certainty about the "ought" than about the "is." I can know
better how the world ought to be (assuming my commitments are
valid ones, and leaving entirely aside for the moment the question of
what, if anything, validates such commitments) than I can know how it
actually is. Personal commitment apart, the universality of legal
norms entails that, assuming I have a correct grasp of valid norms of
some system of positive law, I can know with considerable certainty
how things ought to be according to that system of law, even when I
can never be certain how they are, or how they have been, in the territory for which the law is valid. (This, I suppose, is a generalized version of Jerome Frank's "fact skepticism.") 3
Let us therefore acknowledge that the "ought," however puzzling
we may sometimes find it at the deepest ontological level, has at least
the possibility of a degree of clarity and certainty that the "is" often
lacks. Nevertheless, all is not entirely simple. For, in a concrete situation, I may wonder what I or someone else ought to do or to have
done, and may with some confidence conclude that the case is covered by a relevant norm like "thou shalt not kill" or "promises ought
to be kept, and here a promise was made." Or, I may take a single
simple norm of that kind and reflect on it as in some way clearly valid
for some context orjurisdiction. But it also seems that no such single
normative judgment or proposition really makes sense on its own or
in isolation. The judgment or proposition makes sense only when it is
fitted together with whole congeries of other norms. Especially in the
context of the particular judgment-"what ought to be done or to
have been done?"-or deliberation-"what to do now?"-there may
be many normatively salient aspects of the situation, so that one's
judgment or conclusion, all things considered, has taken account of
more than one norm in its bearing on the situation. In this sense,
normative judgments and deliberations do not relate to, presuppose,
or derive from single isolated norms, but rather some conception of
normative order about the way things ought to be and ought to go on,
taking the whole range of events, things, and possibilities as they appear to us at any particular time and place. This prompts an inquiry
into the idea of "normative order."
I
NoimATIvE ORDER

Normative order is a kind of ideal order. At any given time, we
may form a view of the world as we think it is, including the set of
ongoing human actions and intentions for action. We may set against
3
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that a view of the world as it could be or could become, leaving out
certain actions, leaving some actual intentions abandoned or unfulfilled, while other actions take place instead of those left out, and
other intentions are fostered and brought to fulfillment. A view of the
world as it could be or could become is an ideal view of it. An ideal
view may be constructed in terms that rule out or imperatively exclude
certain ways of acting on all occasions on which such action might
otherwise be contemplated, and that insist on or imperatively include
certain other ways of acting as always called for, despite any contrary
4
temptation.
There is a notorious ambiguity in the term "ideal" and most of its
cognates in the various European languages. Sometimes we mean by
it that which exists merely in idea, that is, within ideas held by some
person or persons, whether for good or ill, or in a neutral way. Sometimes, however, "ideal" conveys the notion of a favored or even highly
favored idea. Normative order, of course, is ideal in the sense of the
favored or preferred idea, not merely the neutral idea, yet it falls short
of any "best of all possible worlds" perfectionism. Normative order is
practical, both in the sense that it guides praxis, guides what we do,
and therefore, is also practical in the sense of practicable. It is an
order that is envisaged as a practically realizable state of the world,
given things as they are and persons as they are here and now. To the
extent that it is realized, the world is a better, more satisfactory, world
than if no such guideline were envisaged or followed.
"Norms" are propositions that we formulate with reference to,
and as singled-out elements of, normative order. In primary form,
they are either exclusionary provisions (i.e., negative duties or
prohibitions) that rule out certain ways of acting on all occasions on
which such action might otherwise be contemplated, or provisions of
the converse type (i.e., positive duties or obligations) that call for, or
insist upon, certain ways of acting as required of a person despite any
contrary temptation, or countervailing reason for action.
Of course, this is not an attempt to explain norms or values in
terms of value-free facts. The notion of the "better" or "more satisfactory" built into the account of normative order as ideal order shows
normative order to belong within, not independently of, values as fundamental elements in all human consciousness.
Also essential to making sense of these concepts is the way in
which the practical concerns that which engages a person's will.
Merely to envisage a possible world extrapolated from the actual one,
even to think of it in some purely contemplative way, as better than
4 Cf Georg Henrik von Wright, Is and Ought, in MAN, LAW AND MODERN FoRMs OF
LiiE 263, 267-68 (Eugenio Bulygin et al. eds., 1985) (discussing the use of "ought" in
"norm-formulations").
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the actual, is not to cross over into the realm of the normative. A
steady commitment of the will to realization of some ideal order as a
coherent and realizable state of the world is what that transition requires. The will directed towards realizing a practicable, rationally coherent, and humanly satisfactory ideal order constitutes it as
normative order. Only by reference to such an order is it possible to
establish the difference between right and wrong actions. Those actions are right that are not excluded from the conceived order; those
that it excludes as actions and to which it denies fulfillment in intention, are wrong. The dichotomy between wrong and not-wrong (or
between wrong and right-in-the-sense-of-not-wrong) is the fundamental differentiation of actions or of intended or planned acts in a normative order. What a person engages upon when aiming to make
normative order actual, is the task of, or commitment to, avoiding
wrongdoing.
The world as already-in-part-ideal order is that upon which we
base our conceptions of normative order, the ideal order that would
exist if practically removable imperfections were to be purged from
the way things go on now. Most promises that are made are, in due
course, kept. Truthfulness and honesty are more frequent for most of
us than lying and cheating. To formulate the principles that promises
ought to be kept, that lies ought not to be told, nor frauds perpetrated, is to set terms for an ideal order, but not one that stands absolutely apart from actuality, neither in terms of what is commonly
done, nor in terms of what others in our communities commonly assert as principles for ideal order.
Thus, normative order does not stand in absolute contrast with
actuality. Quite a lot of what goes on is perfectly compatible with what
is right from the point of view of any reasonable moral attitude. Moreover, this is the case, at least in part, because people share legal systems and moral attitudes or converge in the moral demands and
conceptions of the moral order they endorse. The world, as it is, does
not unfold independently of human wills. On the contrary, the
human world-as-it-is goes on as it goep on through human choices and
decisions. However imperfectly, these choices and decisions reflect
and conform to the conceptions of legal and moral rectitude held by
the choosing and deciding agents. So normative order as ideal order
does not, by its envisaged contents or substance, stand in any absolute
contrast with the world-as-it-is. Indeed, our normative commitments
come out of our response to the world-as-it-is, our satisfaction or dissatisfaction with it as it is and as it goes on, and our sense of the practicable alternatives to what does or might happen.
There are, it seems to me, three ways in which human beings
come to an awareness and understanding of normative order.
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Through nurture, socialization, and education, we are exposed to and
socialized into some common views of the right and the wrong, and
gradually led to an ability to be at least partly self-regulating against
the standing norms implicit, and partly explicit, in this common view.
Then, in modern conditions, we fall into a series of rather institutionalized settings in which rules are made even more explicit than in the
general familial and social milieu. For everyone nowadays, this includes the experience of school, with compulsory attendance; for
many, still, even in a secularizing society, participation to some extent
in a church, mosque, synagogue, or other structured religious observance plays an important part. Nearly everybody participates in sports
and games as player or spectator, or both; and expertise about rules of
play and rules of national and international competitions organized
by officials and representative bodies is at least as widespread as knowledge and understanding of state law. Thirdly, though, state agencies
such as police, courts, and in a more remote way, other official organs
(up to and including parliaments and international agencies) define
one particularly authoritative, explicit, and highly regulated normative order for us.
At the very least, our picture of normative order emerges out of
heteronomous orders, where others communicate norms to us and we
learn to follow them, usually under some external incentive. The idea
that any of us could invent a whole moral order for herself or himself
is absurd. It is inevitable that we start from some learned or acquired
framework of practical thought, gradually develop our own critical
awareness of it as something for which we take responsibility, and adjust in the light of what seems to us reasonable. Our learning experience is one geared to developing an at least partial autonomy.5 What
we learn is to monitor and guide our own conduct against criteria of
right and wrong that are conventional norms in some cases and formally enacted rules in others.
In a fundamental way, though, the possibility of developing fully
autonomous judgment at the end of one's learning experience is that
which makes intelligible the very concept of normative order. The
telos of moral development is the fully responsible moral agent who
takes responsibility for his or her judgments at all levels, and whose
volitional commitment to some ideal of order is categorical, not conditional. Only a being that can act in a self-regulating way, judging
between possible courses of action through voluntary commitment to
some rationally willed order, and seeking to realize the willed order in
action, can fully grasp the concept of "wrong" action, and therefore,
5
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the concept of ight-as-not-wrong action. Only such a being can make
full sense of auxiliary verbs such as "ought" or "should."
This account both presupposes and points toward reasons for believing the thesis that autonomy is fundamental to morality. Conceptually, I would suggest, the idea of autonomy that was sketched above
is fundamental to any idea of normative order. For in the last result,
only an autonomous being can respond through acts of volition to the
requirements of normative order. Normative order guides choices,
but does not cause them. Choices are voluntary responses to an idea
of order, not conditioned reflexes. On the other hand, the concept
of a rationally coherent order in which universalizable principles find
their place presupposes the agent's exposure to some conventional or
institutional social ordering initially heteronomous in character from
the agent's point of view. In the development of moral agency, heteronomy precedes autonomy.
II
INSTITUrTONAL NoRmATnrvE ORDER

Necessarily, normative order involves judgment. Being subject to
a norm is being liable to judgment by oneself and by others in case
one's conduct does not match up to what is required. Particular
norms are to be envisaged as fragments drawn from a presupposed
ideal order in the sense indicated, or as propositions formulated to
capture the sense of that order in relation to a given type of situation.
They are exclusionary or mandatory prescriptions that posit some
course of conduct as wrong or as obligatory. To engage with a norm
as an acting subject is to judge what must be done in a given context;
to reflect in normative terms upon one's own or another's conduct in
a given setting is to judge, against some envisaged norm, whether what
was done ought to have been done or ought not to have been done.
The judgment that an act ought not to have been done normally entails a consequential judgment of the measure of penitence, restitution, or censure that is apt to the case. All in all, to think normatively
is to thinkjudgmentally. This is a general and significant truth about
all forms of normative order.
Judgment is sometimes purely personal and autonomous; sometimes it is conventional and heteronomous, without being institutionalized. It can also, however, be institutionalized, or, if you will,
organized. The first step towards this can be seen wherever, in a question involving two parties, a third is asked to help. Such a third party
can be a relatively impartial judge between two persons on whom
some norm impinges differentially. Reference to such an impartial
third party can become a standing practice in a variety of situations.
Thus, over some range of topics, some persons may acquire a standing
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role as judges, to whom reference may be made; it can come about
that the judgment of such persons acquires mandatory force within
some normative order, in the sense that a person who wishes action
taken in virtue of some normative judgment must either handle the
matter in a purely voluntary way, or resort to compulsory action only
under judgment of such a judge. Then appeals may or may not be
allowed; but once judgment is institutionalized, there has to be some
rule about the finality of judgment; i.e., a rule that it is obligatory to
accept and carry out the judgment of the ultimate court, and that it is
forbidden to take any further action beyond that ultimately authorized under the final judgment.6
Norms involve judgment, and judgment, as I noted, is either personal and autonomous, or, in some measure, institutionalized. Institutionalization of judgment is a fundamental feature of the
organization of normative orders. In one form or another, it occurs
in a wide variety of settings, through churches; sporting organizations;
commercial guilds and leagues; international organizations and agencies; and also, of course, paradigmatically in the state.
An inevitable effect of institutionalization ofjudgment, especially
where there comes into being a group or a corps ofjudges acting in a
coordinated way under a common structure of appeals, is that normative order must come to be conceived as systemic in character; and the
system in question necessarily possesses, as Teubner and Luhmann
point out, a self-referential quality. 7 For it has to be a question in any
dispute what the governing norm is and how it is to be interpreted.
Finality of judgment entails final authority on the question of what
counts as a binding norm, and how it bears on the case. What makes
the judgment final is a norm of the normative order that makes respect for judgments obligatory in every case; but the judgment that
such a norm, or any other norm, belongs to the order, is itself one
which can be pronounced with final effect only by an appropriate
judge or court. And the same postulated normative order is that
which makes a given judge or court appropriate, or (in the more technical term) "competent" to judge on the question.
Whenever this is so, it follows that, relative to any institutional
normative system, there is a way, conclusive within the system, to determine what counts as an authoritative norm of the system, or a definitely established right or duty of some person under the system.
There is even a way to determine what counts as a person under the
6
Cf. NEIL MAcCoRMICK, H.L.A. HART 103-20 (1981) (discussing the "secondary
rules" that help build a legal system).
7
GUNTHER TEUBNER, LAW AS AN AuToPoITIc SYSTEM 13-24 (Zenon Bankowski ed.,
Anne Bankowska & Ruth Adler trans., 1993); Niklas Luhmann, Law as a Social System, 83
Nw. U. L. REv. 136, 141-43 (1989).
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system, and what kinds of practical social and business arrangements
can be set up with binding effect in the system. 8 The way is, of course,
that of recourse to the judgment of those competent to judge. Otto
Brusiin has remarked that, although questions about sales or marriages matter to us in quite diverse ways in the ordinary social milieu,
what counts in law as a "sale" or a "marriage" is a question that the law
courts necessarily have ultimate authority to determine. 9 And they
have associated authority to say what ulterior legal rights, duties, powers, and the like follow consequentially upon the existence of a sale or
a marriage according to law. But which law courts? Could there be
merchants' tribunals deciding about sales? Or sporting tribunals deciding about the valid transfer through "sale" of a footballer's contract? Or church courts deciding about marriages?
As we know, each of these is possible. There can be tribunals of
many kinds, and these can deal with similar questions affecting the
same human individuals. But the characteristic of an institutional
normative order is that competent judgment in it is conclusive within
its own order, except to the extent that there is coordinated crossrecognition of different orders, as obtained between Pope and Emperor in the Middle Ages, or between European Communities and
member-state legal orders today. Where a plurality of judgments,
each conclusive within a particular order, can be passed, the question
is: which ought to prevail? As a question within a self-referential system, such a question is of course self-answering, for the system's agencies can never say other than that the system's norm ought to prevail.
As a question for a person confronted by competing judgments of substanially the same question in practically different senses, the issue is
which to respect, on grounds external to the self-referential answer
that rival normative orders provide. Shall a state court decree of divorce, or a church court prohibition or nullification of the state's decree be taken as final? Shall the judgment of the state tribunal or the
trade union tribunal be observed? And so on.
The answer to the question, "Which to respect?" has both prudential and moral aspects. Which ought one to respect, all things considered? Which is least disadvantageous, all things considered, to
ignore? In cases of conflict, the answer to the latter question, the prudential answer, will be considerably affected both by the weight and
balance of conventional opinions and by power relations, and these
will also be relevant, though with different scales of weight, to the former, the moral question. But insofar as power relations enter the
question, the issue is, as I shall shortly try to show, one of politics.
8

See Neil MacCormick, Institutions, Arrangements and PracticalInformation, 1 RATio

Ju~is 73, 79-80 (1988).
9
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Whoever can make a judgment prevail in the last resort, in the sense
of its being carried through by force if necessary, and can reliably and
predictably enforce such judgments in the general run, has political
power; that political power backs, and to a degree reinforces, the authority and prestige of the tribunal whose judgment is enforced, and
that of the normative order to which the tribunal self-referentially
belongs.
In the world as it has been, and still to a very large extent is,
power of the relevant kind has been territorially concentrated, and
each relevant territory has been that of a state. The coercively predominant normative orders have been those of states, though they
have rarely, if ever, succeeded in absolutely eliminating rival orders of
one kind or another. This is why there has been such a tendency to
take for granted the equation of "law" with "state law," though this has
had serious and distortive effects for legal theory.
Two obviously significant aspects of the interrelation of coercive
power with normative order (thus, also the interrelation of state with
law) are of course that of executive power and that of legislative
power. The executive possesses the direct command of the agencies
of organized physical coercion that can back up the power of judgment or, in cases of serious breakdown, disown and overthrow it. The
legislature possesses, normally, the kind of democratic or quasi-democratic (or other ideological) legitimation that contributes significantly
to the acceptability and durability over time of the coercive power that
is organized under the executive. A delicate and shifting balance of
power relations normally obtains here. But always, there is a question
whether the due exercise of either legislative or executive power is a
matter subjected to judicial judgment, and hence, itself incorporated
into the normative order that it so crucially supports. Where it is so
incorporated, the state is a Rechtsstaat, a state-under-law, a "law-state,"
as Ake Frindberg tells us to call it.10
In a law-state, the question of which exercises of executive power
are valid is a question of law; the political power of the executive is
restrained under the authority of law. Likewise, it is for the courts to
say what resolutions of the legislature constitute validly enacted norms
of law, and how they are to be interpreted. The authority of the legislature is not a matter of democratic or ideological or hereditary legitimacy extraneous to law, but is itself, conferred by law, or at least
confirmed by it on terms that effectively limit the power of lawmaking.
Self-referentiality here shades over into "autopoiesis." In such a state,
10 Ake Frdndberg, The Law State (1994) (unpublished manuscript). I am wholly indebted to my friend Professor Ake Frdndberg of Uppsala for the use of the term "lawstate," which he has advanced in an unpublished manuscript shown to me, and about
which we have had several discussions.
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there can also be an independent profession of legal science, analyzing the valid law, discussing the limits of its validity, offering interpretations that display some overall coherence and systematicity in the
legal (normative) order conceived as an ideal unity. This scientific
construction of order and system is itself an act of rational reconstruction extrapolating from the given material." But in turn, it is a reconstruction that reinforces the conception of law as a "system," and
posits the systematicity of law as a guiding ideal for judges in particular, and, to a degree, for legislators and officials of executive
12
government.
Law conceived as institutional normative order can thus come to
be constitutive of a law-state. However, as Kelsen pointed out, there
are two possible ways to conceive and represent the order as a working
system. The first is a dynamic way.' 3 Here, the process of change
through time is central, including the way in which legal provisions
themselves set the terms for valid change. This produces a representation of the order with a special focus on the processes of norm-creation, and on the processes of establishing institutional arrangements
(contracts, trusts, and the like) within private and lower-level public
law. When we represent a 'normative order in this dynamic way, we
represent it in terms of the norms that regulate change, individuated
as norms of competence, power-conferring rules, or institutive rules of
legal institutions.
4
The second is what Kelsen called a "static" representation.'
Here, we represent the order by individuating rules or norms prescribing duties, or conferring rights either permissive or beneficial.
Sometimes, in an even more microscopic way, we simply individuate
particular duties and rights, depending on the current focus of attention. 15 But this "static" conception proves to be misnamed; it concerns not stasis, but rather, momentary normative judgment, whether
the judgment envisaged is that of a court seeking to determine a litgated question; or that of a citizen engaged in practical judgment over
what to do or demand in a given setting; or indeed, that of a scholar
trying to produce a coherent representation of some branch of the
law. The recognition of rights and duties in this practicaljudgmental
setting is, in any event, an intellectual procedure different from that
11 See Neil Maceormick, Four Quadrants of Jurisprudence, in PREscRiPTVE FoRMALrrY
AND NORMATIE RATIONALITY IN MODERN LEGAL SYSTEMS 53 (Werner Krawietz et al. eds.,
1994).
12
Cf Joxerramon Bengoetxea, Legal System as a Regulative Ideal 53 ARCHV FOR
REci-rrs-uND SOZIALPHILOSOPHIE 65, 70-78 (1994).
13 See HANS KELSEN, PuRE THEORY OF LAW 193-278 (Max Knight trans. of 2d ed., University of California Press 1967) (1934).
14
iL at 108-92.
15 See id. at 125-44.
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of seeking guidance about the valid exercise of normative power
within a normative order dynamically conceived; the two interact and
overlap, but are not the same. Law as a normative order has two aspects, the dynamic and the momentary. H.L.A. Hart sought to draw
these together into a single structure of "primary and secondary
rules," but there is a notorious difficulty about the interconnection of
his "rule of recognition" with "rules of change" and "rules of adjudication." 16 A proper representation of a legal system may reasonably take
one or other of several forms, depending on one's practical concerns
of the time. Material that is characterized in one way in a dynamic
perspective, takes a different shape when viewed in a momentary-judgmental perspective. There is no single, uniquely correct reconstruction of the raw material of law into a single canonical form of "legal
system."

LAw AND

III
PoLrncs, LAW AND MoRALIY

The final task of the day is to sharpen our sense of the distinction
between positive law and the two other realms of thought and action
with which it is most intimately interrelated, and yet interrelated as
something conceptually distinct, a genuine third term, not simply an
amalgam of the first two. Politics is concerned with law-lawmaking
and legal reform, appointments to key legal offices, maintenance of
the forces of law and order, and supporting the rulings of the courts.
Yet politics is not law, nor law politics, despite occasional assertions to
the contrary from the ramparts of Critical Legal Studies. Morality is
concerned with law, with the criticism of legal decisions and legal
rules, with the issue of obligation to respect the law, and with the question of law's claim to be genuinely normative, genuinely engaged with
the world of the "ought." Yet morality is not law, nor is law morality,
nor a subdepartment of morality, although this has sometimes been
claimed by thinkers in the tradition of "natural law." I want to reapply
here ideas developed in some recent papers concerning these distinctions. 17 The key ideas are those of power, which seems to me especially focal for politics, and autonomy, which seems to me definitive
for morality. Let us see how these ideas help with the distinctions
sought.
Politics is a matter of power, of the actual exercise of power
within human societies or communities, and of elaborating principles
for the proper exercise of power. Political power is the power to di16 See MACCORMICK, supra note 6, at 103-20.
17 See Neil MacCormick, Beyond the Sovereign State, 56 MOD. L. REv. 1 (1993); Neil MacCormick, The Concept of Law and "The Concept of Law", 14 OxFoRDJ. LEcAL STUD. 1 (1994);
Neil MacCormick, The Relative Heteronomy of Law, 3 EUR. J. PHIL. 69 (1995).
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rect social agencies and individuals to certain defined ends, presumptively for the common good, to dispose of available goods (economic
and noneconomic) among persons and groups, and to protect the
group against interference from agencies external to it. The power
that we have in mind here is power-in-fact, not simply normative
power; that is, power to make sure that somebody in fact acts in a
certain way, rather than power to bring it about that somebody ought
to act in a certain way. Political power is power-in-fact; but what is
sometimes termed "legal power" is power of the other sort, normative
power, power confined to the realm of the "ought."
Law interacts with politics in many ways, sometimes as an object
over and through which political power is exercised, and sometimes as
a control upon the use and abuse of power. But law is not itself constituted by the power-in-fact to effect social change. Law is a form of
normative order, setting patterns of right and wrong conduct and conferring powers that are normative rather than coercive in their intrinsic character. Nobody doubts that the United States Constitution
conferred and still confers the normative power to ban the manufacture, sale, and consumption of alcohol for beverage purposes. If exercised, this entails that, according to law, alcohol ought not to be
manufactured, sold, or consumed for those purposes. The experiment
of the 1920s, however, proved that this legal normative power was not
conjoined with sufficient power-in-fact to change the drinking practices of Americans. This sufficiently exemplifies the distinction I have
here in mind-politics is about power, law is about normative order.
Certainly, one might want to add that not every exercise of brute
power is itself a matter of politics. We are often inclined to contrast
political with military approaches to the solution of civil conflicts (e.g.,
in Northern Ireland or in Chechnya). The difference is in the elements of persuasion, negotiation, and discourse. Politics concerns the
exercise of power through mainly peaceful discussion, persuasion,
and negotiation within forms of government which at least purport to
be directed towards a pursuit of the common good in a way that could
in principle win general consent among the population governed.
Still, however discursive politics may be, the discourse remains one of
power in the sense defined.
In its discursive aspect, politics has essential connections with morality. Morality in its most fundamental sense has to be grasped in
terms akin to those of Kant's Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals,'8
and with some regard to Jfirgen Habermas's ideas on a "procedural"

18
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account of the foundations of moral reasoning. 19 Morality concerns a
normative order that is conceived to be valid independently of power
and yet to be universal in scope, addressing every moral agent as such.
Since it is independent of power, it is necessarily autonomous in its
force-for each agent, its binding force or normative validity lies in
that agent's own rational will. It is therefore discursive and controversial as well as autonomous. Moral principles are those we can argue
out in conditions of free and uncoercive discourse, accepting that
they must be universal in application and must take account of the
interests and ideals of all persons capable of participating in the discourse or capable of being affected by its outcome. Each person is as
fully entitled to enter into moral discourse as every other, and the
ultimate judgment of right and wrong in moral matters is, for each
agent, a matter of the conclusions one draws after engagement in actual or imagined discourse with others. The drawing of conclusions
characteristic of a rational will depends upon arguments from a sense
of overall coherence of the positions to which we commit ourselves in
essentially discursive and uncoercive contexts.
Morality in a less fundamental sense is located in the common or
conventional principles and rules held by persons in communities,
often in connection with religious observances and traditions. To
show why this sense is less fundamental, one need only ponder the
question of why these principles and rules have authority over a moral
agent. One of only two answers is possible. Either their authority derives from the agent's own willing commitment to them, or it derives
from the power, however crude or subtle, of community opinion and
persuasion or disapproval that keeps the individual in line. In the
former case, they are incorporated in the agent's morality through
autonomous choice; hence conventional morality is subordinated to
individual autonomy. In the latter case, individuals are subjected to
the exercise of power, however diffuse and ill-defined, and the rules of
conventional morality are an element in the politics of community. If
we are to understand morality as a distinct realm of thought and judgment, it can only be through giving conceptual primacy to the discursive-autonomous conception of morality.
Law has positivity. We look to law for answers to questions about
what is obligatory or permissible within some sphere of decisionmaking. Inside that sphere of decisionmaking, what the law prescribes is
what "ought" to be done to satisfy the institutionalized system. Relative to a presupposed system, law lays down what is obligatory or permissible, not what from some ideal point of view ought to be
obligatory or permissible. A properly taken decision that a certain
19
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rule shall be enacted into law does confer on that rule the character
of being an actual rule of law. A properly taken decision about some
disputed point of right between two persons settles conclusively the
legal rights of each upon that point, just as a properly taken decision
upon an accusation of crime settles conclusively the legal guilt or innocence of the accused person.
Law resembles morality in that it is normative; it resembles conventional morality in being a normative order commonly observed in
some community or society, and backed by both strong pressures of
opinion, and the regularly confirmed belief that others apply norms
that are regarded as common standards for the group in question.
States being territorial political communities 'organized under governments capable of wielding coercive power over individuals and groups
and in response to external forces, the law of states is backed not only
by opinion but also by the coercive force of political power. But it is
important to remember that the law of the state is not the only law
that human beings have, and that the Rechtsstaat is, as was argued already, that particular form of state in which the law provides decisive
and actually operative criteria for the rightful use of power. Such
states have empirically a greater durability than police-states or partystates. In law-states, the legitimacy of the exercise of governmental
power is guaranteed by law, and this is not something that simply follows from the existence of a sovereign state as such. This further indicates that the legal and the political are not to be treated as identical,
however closely they interact in fortunate circumstances.
One manifestation of law's positivity lies in the way in which, on
questions of law, there frequently seems to be a fact of the matter,
checkable by reference to publicly accessible sources. If a person
wants to find out whether there is a maximum speed limit on the
roads of a country, or a maximum permitted level of blood alcohol for
drivers, there are sources to which one can quite easily look for an
answer. Explicit rules on such matters are to be found in pieces of
legislation, frequently supplemented by pieces of subordinate legislation. Furthermore, secondary sources, such as legal textbooks or government publications about road traffic, assist in identifying them.
On the moral question of how fast it is right to drive, or how
much, if any, alcohol it is morally acceptable to drink before driving,
there is no interpersonally checkable source establishing a quantitative limit; such questions can only be settled through moral discourse,
weighing relevant arguments, and establishing considerations relevant
to the issue at hand. Their settlement from time to time depends on
the conscientious judgment of a moral agent, whether or not in conformity with the conscientious judgment of other agents actually or
potentially participating in the relevant discourse. Of course, it would

1066

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 82:1051

be difficult to comprehend a claim that the norms of positive law in
the state regulating alcohol consumption by drivers are irrelevant or
weightless in a moral deliberation on the topic in question. But it
would be even harder to comprehend, far less accept, a claim that
morally, the enacted rules could have the conclusive character they
have within legal deliberation.
20
The settled, positive character of law is jurisdiction-relative.
How fast one may drive is a question differently answered in different
places governed by different legal systems under the jurisdiction of
different organs or agencies. The fact of the legal matter is a fact
about some discrete legal system, and where the law in question is
state law, the answer normally holds good only in respect of the territory of the given state. Sixty miles per hour is the maximum permitted speed on roads in the United Kingdom, other than designated
"Motorways," on which the maximum is seventy miles per hour. That
holds good, of course, only for roads in the United Kingdom regulated by the Road Traffic Acts. If I visit another country, such as Canada, I expect the rules to be different, and even expressed in different
units of measurement. There, I have to check on maxima in terms of
kilometers per hour; and so on. In each jurisdiction, I look for some
distinct piece of legislation (or other authoritative law text) that settles
the matter within that jurisdiction.
Moral judgments, however personal and controversial, are not in
this way relativistic. If I hold that driving above a certain speed is inherently dangerous to life and limb, or wasteful of natural resources,
and if I hold that humans ought not to endanger each others' bodily
safety, or make excessive demands on nonrenewable resources, then I
must hold that speeding is wrong wherever it may cause danger or use
too much fuel. Thesejudgments apply universally. No doubt they are
susceptible only to being supported with arguments in a moral discourse, without any interpersonally authoritative source to check
against; but in their own character they are universalizable claims, not
restricted by jurisdiction or territoriality. Certainly, circumstances alter cases morally; but they do so in a universalizable way. The truth of
moral matters is not checkable by reference to established, public,
and institutional sources. But their truth is an unrestricted and universal truth to the extent we can establish it at all.
Here may rest the argument on the dual contrast of law with politics and with morality. Law is both a normative and an institutional
order, and this connects it with the two poles of the contrast. As a
normative order, it replicates certain features of morality, and conCf Neil MacCormick, Comment, in ISSUES IN CONTEMPORARY LEGAL PHILosoPHY. THE
H.L.A. HART 105 (Ruth Gavison ed., 1987) (discussing the jurisdictional relativity of the validity of positive law).
20
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nects necessarily to morality in certain ways. As an institutional order,
it connects necessarily to politics and is in part constitutive of the
political, while well-conducted politics is necessary to the maintenance
of systems of positive law, and especially state law.
CONCLUSION

I have tried to outline how to approach an understanding of law
as institutional normative order conceptually distinct from morality
and from politics. By focusing on an idea of institutional normative
order, one negates the existence of any analytically necessary nexus
between law and state. Law is institutional normative order, and state
law is simply one form of law. Conversely, the state is a form of territorial political order with some internal power structure and power relations, and the law-state is simply one form of state. This entails a firm
denial of Kelsen's assertion that every state is a Rechtsstaat, a lawstate,2 ' at any rate in a minimalist, nonideological sense, on the
ground that law and state are in effect the same object viewed in different terms. This is not to be accepted. They are not the same object
at all. The law-state is, in fact, the only morally acceptable form of
state, and the mere existence of some institutional normative order
within a state does not guarantee that the state's power is effectively
limited and regulated by law. That limitation is a difficult, but vitally
important, achievement of statecraft, as is all the more important the
achievement of the quality of a Rechtsstaat in a more substantial
22
sense.
All this helps in building an understanding of the coming world
order beyond the sovereign state. That order will enhance the moral
significance of the law-state by enlarging and internationalizing the
legal orders to which the state comes to be subjected. The development of a legal order under the European Human Rights Convention
as well as the development of the legal order of the European Communities, and the subjection of European States ever more firmly to
one, and in some cases to both, show the way forward here.
It always remains, in the end, a question of whether the law constituted by some institutional normative order really has validity, really
is binding. This can be handled in two ways. As a question of law, it
receives a clear, but clearly self-referential answer. Any purported
legal provision is either a valid member of a given system or not,
either binding according to that system or not. But the law itself,
through those it determines to be competentjudges, regulates the ansupra note 13, at 312-13.
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swer to the question posed. Such answers have the merit of being
objective, often clear, and authoritative.
The interpersonal objectivity of such judgments is a great merit in
them, both from a prudential and from a moral point of view. But
from the standpoint of the autonomous judgment, the price of interpersonal objectivity is, as always, heteronomy. If it is right to insist on
the judgment of the autonomous moral agent as the final touchstone
of morality, two things follow. First, even the most morally acceptable
form of law remains crucially distinct from morality itself. Second, the
ultimate basis of normative practical judgment ought to be morality,
not law. The binding force of law is either a simple matter of intrasystemic, self-referential, and self-authenticating judgment, or it is for
some moral agent autonomously endorsed. Only in the latter case is it
fully normative. Only then does it, or should it, guide conduct
categorically.
CODA

The text as presented above is almost identical with that
presented to the Cornell Law Review Symposium on March 1, 1997.
But I wish to acknowledge my very great indebtedness to Professor
William Ewald, from the University of Pennsylvania Law School, for
pulling out some of the implications of my position as stated, and for
adding historical context to some of my themes, in a way infinitely
better than I could have done, and in a way that I recognize as fully
compatible with the position I have tried to state.2 3 In particular, I
agree that the possibility of a legal pluralism implicit in my position,
and hence the possibility of an individual's legal position being a matter of inquiry into more than one normative order, has something in
common with premodern ideas of law. Professor Ewald explains in a
masterly way the extent to which von Gierke drew on these models in
his critique of the overweening pretensions of the nineteenth-century
state.2 4 One might add that similar inspiration perhaps underlies
some of the work of French institutionalists of the same period, and
later.2 5 So it may be that contemporary institutionalism such as that
represented in my present Article has a greater continuity in thought
than is sometimes supposed with earlier "institutionalisms." Anyway, it
does not seem to me to be merely antiquarian to advocate a revived
awareness of the possibilities of, and opportunities for, a form of normative pluralism in the contemporary world. In Europe particularly,
there are now "new legal orders" beyond the law of the state, and state
23 William Ewald, Comment on MacCormick, 82 CORNELL L. REv. 1071 (1997).
24 Id. at 1074-76.
25 SeeJuLIUS STONE, SociAL DIMENSIONS OF LAW AND JuSTIcE 516-45 (1966) (discussing
the work of Maurice Hauriou, Georges Renard, and associated thinkers).
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sovereignty is at least problematized in the context of the European
Union. Whether there will or can be long-run stability beyond the
confines of sovereignty as it was classically conceived is still an open
question, and keeping the question open is a valid task for an openminded philosophy of law at this time.
Professor Ewald also gives valuable historical context for an appreciation of the way in which Kelsen came at the problem of the
"dualism" of law and state. 26 Kelsen sees the law and the state as the
same thing viewed differently-the state is simply the legal order personified. Hence, in a weak or minimalist sense every state has to be a
"law-state" since it simply is the legal system conceptualized as an acting subject. It does not, however, follow that it is a Rechtsstaat in the
stronger ideological sense of having a legal system with separation of
powers and recognition and protection for fundamental human
rights. Where I differ with Kelsen, and perhaps also with Ewald, is in
doubting the tenability even of the weak or minimalist claim about the
state as law-state. If the legal order is a normative order, and if the
state is an order of political power relations, it is an open question
how far and how effectively the power relations are mediated through
law, even rather skeletal law. To bring power even under not-veryenlightened law is still something of an achievement in my view, and
Kelsen seems to me to err in treating as an analytical truth what is in
fact an achievement of statecraft, and quite a significant achievement
at that. (All the greater, of course, when the subjection to law is subjection to a law that enshrines respect for human rights and the like.)
Finally, I must say how greatly I benefited from attending the discussion of all the articles presented in the present volume. They suggest to me three things. First, we do have to wrestle with the
dichotomy of obligation versus inclination introduced by Professor
Cooter. 27 My present discussion of normative order is an attempt to
come to terms with that. Second, context is all-important in coming
to any understanding of the normative. We frequently, and perhaps
necessarily, single out particular norms to talk about, whether instructions about soupmeat or norms about trust between principal and
agent. But no single norm ever "exists" in isolation. What makes a
particular norm conceivable is the way it takes place in a larger ordering, viz, a normative order. This is strongly implicit in both Professor
Greenawalt's discussion of interpretation, 28 and Professor Cooter's
use of the bargaining game as a test-bed for his account of normativ-
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Ewald, supra note 23, at 1072-74.
Robert Cooter, Normative Failure Theory of Law, 82

CORNELL

L. REv. 947, 953-68

(1997).
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Kent Greenawalt, From the Bottom Up, 82 CORNELL L. REv. 994 (1997).
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ity.2 9 We cannot understand any "ought" in isolation from some overall schema of judgment, that is some normative order out of which
one individuates a norm for some purpose.
And third, we must consider the extent to which issues of formality and formal validity (the source-based theory of law) concern us in
law, whether as depicted by Professor Summers3 ° or as doubted somewhat by Professors Schauer and Wise.31 We should recognize this as
being quite largely dependent on how we choose to construe or construct or even reconstruct the legal material for the particular practical or theoretical purposes we have in mind at a certain time. I am
pleased to have in other contexts pursued the issue of legal doctrine
as "rational reconstruction" with Professor Summers. 32 I should say
that if we do not construct or reconstruct law as exhibiting a high
degree of formality, we deprive it of the very properties that make
institutional normative order useful or even essential to beings like
ourselves, despite our morally fundamental character as autonomous
agents who are called upon to pass judgment on the value as well as
the validity of the order that emanates from institutions.

29
30

Cooter, supra note 27, at 953-68.
RobertS. Summers, How Law Is Formaland Why It Matters, 82 CORNELL L. REv. 1165

(1997).
31 Frederick Schauer & VirginiaJ. Wise, Legal Positivism as Legal Information, 82 CORNELL L. REv. 1080 (1997).
32 For a discussion of "rational reconstruction," see Zenon Bankowski et al., On
Method and Methodology, in D. NEIL MACCORMICK & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, INTERPRETING STATurEs: A COMPARATnrE STUDY 9, 18-24 (1991). A commitment to this methodological stance
is continued in D. NEIL MACCORMICK & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, INTERPRETING PRECEDENTS: A
COMPARATIVE STUDY (1997), though in this work the relevant conception of "rational reconstruction" is largely carried forward from its predecessor.

